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In  economic  theory,  decision-making  is  supposed  to  result  from  an  optimization 
calculation that any economic agent performs under the essential hypotheses of rationality. It 
means that agents seek to maximize their utility function (if households) or to maximize their 
profit  (if  businesses)  using  efficiently  the  available  resources  to  achieve  these  objectives 
within  the  constraints  they  face  (budget  constraint  for  households,  costs  constraints  for 
businesses
1). There is therefore no waste of resour ces. Tastes and preferences are the first 
elements of choice in economics. In daily life it enables us to understand the specialization of 
some economies since in their research of the maximal satisfaction consumers adapt their 
budget to their hierarchy of taste. For instance the history and culture of French emphasis on 
the quality of life have developed a taste for "eating well" and "good drinking" in the French 
population. French consumers then have a share of spending on food which remains higher 
than the American (also due to the fact that the level of life is higher in the US). Nevertheless 
the smaller share of the American is more devoted to eating out (Jany -Catrice, 2004)
2 and 
includes mainly franchisees restaurants. Because of the French culinary tr adition, one finds, 
however, that the catering branch of activity in France is more than in the US the result of 
                                                 
1 For each possible level of production, the company will seek the optimal amount of each factor to be used, that 
is to say the quantities that can minimize the total cost. 
2 About 50% of total spending on food against 28% in the case of France in 1997.   2 
individual  independent  small  entrepreneurs.  However,  the  choice  of  becoming  an 
entrepreneur in the catering sector is not such a simple choice. We can identify the steps 
which will constitute an illustration of decision-making in economics. One must have a taste 
for this job compared to salaried jobs. For example, one needs to accept to manage a team. It 
is also necessary to identify for which kind of restaurants and in which area opportunities for 
profit for this type of activity exist. This is a problem of information (identification of needs, 
unmet  demand),  which  requires  according  to  Kirzner  (1973)  a  particular  key  ability, 
alertness…  Becoming  an  entrepreneur  also  requires  committing  individual  resources  like 
specific  managerial  abilities  (Lucas,  1978)  or  financial  resources.  Each  individual  is  not 
similarly endowed with these resources which could explain that some are prevented from the 
entrepreneurial  venture.  Entrepreneurial  decision-making  always  involves  individuals  and 
their resources in a risky process, since one anticipates on the basis of current information the 
future  development  of  the  activity  while  a  large  number  of  uncertainties  can  intervene 
(economic  conjuncture,  attractiveness  of  the  restaurant  etc…).  Then  the  choice  to  be  an 
entrepreneur also depends on the risk attitude of the individual. Moreover the optimizing 
calculation refers to complex methods that only few people are able to carry out (Simon, 
1950).  Profit  opportunities  are  thus  partly  built  by  entrepreneurs  according  to  their 
perceptions. For example it is often argued that entrepreneurs show an excessive confidence 
in the success of their businesses due to patterns of simplified decision-making. In this way 
non-economic  factors  such  as  personal  characteristics  of  the  new  entrepreneur  have  an 
influence both on the propensity and the success of the new firm. The "need of achievement" 
and the "locus of control" are the psychological characteristics that resulted in a large number 
of studies in the population of managers or entrepreneurs (Hansemark, 2003). Because setting 
up a firm is also creating his own job, one can argue that the decision to set up a new firm can 
be viewed as a self employment choice. In such a case, it is necessary to link entrepreneurship 
with some individual characteristics (such as human capital level or psychological traits) but 
also  with  some  characteristics  on  the  labor  market  (nature  of  rigidities,  level  of 
unemployment)  and  more  globally  on  the  structure  of  rewards  of  the  economy  (Baumol, 
1990). 
Overall it appears that the choice to become an entrepreneur is complex and takes into 
account tastes of individuals, imperfect information on both opportunities for profit but also 
on  the  skills  of  individuals,  different  access  to  a  certain  initial  resources,  risk‟  attitudes, 
patterns of simplified decision-making, change in the situation of individuals and search for 
personal achievement.  
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1) The standard model of choice (choice in a model of competition 
with perfect information and without uncertainty) 
 
The entrepreneurial choice in a competitive economy without uncertainty and with 
perfect  information  may be interpreted as  any  economic choice, for  example a consumer 
choice. In the standard model each individual is supposed to express coherent choices and so 
to rank all the considered baskets of goods. His preferences are then represented by a utility 
function that depends on the quantity of each consumed good and that expresses the ranking 
by the consumer of different options. The rational consumer chooses, among all the baskets 
that he is able to buy taking into account his budget constraint, his preferred basket of foods, 
the one that maximizes his utility. A set of properties about demand of goods may then be 
deduced from this analysis. 
This  reasoning  can  be  applied  in  the  entrepreneurial  choice  without  uncertainty. 
Suppose  that  in  society  there  are  only  two  job‟s  situations,  being  employed  or  being  an 
entrepreneur  and  that  these  situations  can  be  distinguished  by  four  characteristics 
(management, accountability, independence, sociability etc…). The job of the entrepreneur is 
characterized by high levels of management, accountability, independence and sociability and 
vice versa for the employee. In this case, the agents must make a discrete choice between both 
options depending on their preferences i.e. how they value characteristics of each of these 
options.  If  the  occupational  choice  (being  self-employed  or  employee)  was  along  a 
continuum, then individuals would have to reason at the margin. An optimal decision would 
be such as a small variation would not add anything more. Typically each status presents an 
opportunity cost which depends on the preferences of agents i.e. how they value each of these 
attributes.  A  person  who  values  the  four  characteristics  of  the  entrepreneur  prefers  the 
situation of the entrepreneur because he will get more utility from the entrepreneur status than 
from  the  employee  status.  In  this  case,  the  choice  is  easily  done  but  it  is  nevertheless 
extraordinary that such situations arise because there are actually many more features that in 
our simplified example. One can imagine people who dislike the task of management, but 
who appreciate the sense of responsibility and independence. Some will choose to become 
entrepreneurs  because,  consistent  with  their  preferences,  the  cost  for  them  (to  bear  the 
management‟s responsibilities) is less than the benefits they obtain from responsibility and 
independence. Another way to express it is to say that the opportunity cost of giving up 
independence and responsibility is greater than the benefit of employee status that does not 
have to bear the responsibilities of management. Other people with different tastes will prefer 
the opposite employee status. For them the benefits of non-management will more than offset 
the disadvantages of the loss of independence and responsibility. 
It is necessary to signal that among different type of firms, it is possible to choose 
between different baskets of characteristics.  
For example, being a franchisee gives to the entrepreneur the possibility to relax the 
characteristics of independence and responsibility. To have a partner in the firm is also a way 
to share out responsibility.   4 
Being  on  piecework  relaxes  the  characteristic  of  sociability  and  accounting;  some 
individuals like independence but dislike the relationships with the clients and also some 
accounting work. 
Evans and Leighton (1989) show that individuals that prefer autonomy are more likely 
to become self-employed. Lazear (2005) shows that students that will become entrepreneurs 
have  chosen  to  acquire  a  diversity  of  skills  in  their  education  program  because  it  is  the 
minimum level of the required skills that determines the earnings of the entrepreneur. For 
instance  Lazear  (2005)  shows  that  the  creation  of  a  restaurant  requires  mobilization  of 
numerous different skills; the entrepreneur must certainly do good cooking, but also must 
have taste for decoration, must like to welcome guests, must be able to keep accounts … At 
least if the entrepreneur cannot perform all these skills he needs to know to hire the right 
people in the labor market. 
Yet  the  choice  of  setting-up  a  firm  does  not  come  down  to  the  choice  of  the 
characteristics of a certain status, but also deals with having a project and achieving it in a 
complex and risky world where information is not perfect. One of the first problems is to 
identify a project that is to say, to seize market opportunities.   5 
2)  The  entrepreneur  and  the  market:  foremost  a  problem  of 
information and adjustment 
 
Schumpeter  in  his  seminal  work  (1911)  has  noted  the  predominant  role  of  the 
innovative entrepreneur that drives the growth and that breaks the economic circuit otherwise 
indefinitely reproducible. For that purpose bank loans are necessary to divert intermediate and 
investment goods in order to realize the innovation (at the end added value by innovation 
overcome prices‟ increase due to bank loans). Yet the role of the entrepreneur is so linked 
with growth that he appears to be more driven by personal traits (cf. below) and that all the 
explanation is embedded in the innovation characteristic without any more explanation about 
the functioning of the market. A great deal of debates around market equilibrium and planned 
versus  market  functioning  of  economies  arose  in  the  twenties/thirties  (Mises/Lange). 
According to the market hypothesis of pure and perfect competition, which constitutes the 
general framework of analysis in economics, all information is available at no cost nor any 
delay for every firm or consumer so that: 
 “For a society, then, we can speak of a state of equilibrium at a point of time-but it 
means only that the different plans which the individuals composing it have made for action 
in time are mutually compatible”.  
(Hayek, [1937],1948, p.41). 
But the view of the market is obviously more complex. According to Hayek's notable 
works on the role of information and the discovery process in the market (1937, 1945, 1948, 
1968),  the  market  is  a  process  in  perpetual  adjustment  where  the  building  of  the  needs, 
preferences and production plans are themselves inseparable from interaction, demonstration 
and learning‟s effects (Heertje, 1979). 
For example businesses adjust over time the features of their products according to the 
information that they can get on the satisfaction of their customers (restaurants and cafes fill 
their slack periods thanks to happy hours, usually they renew their menu in order to adapt 
themselves  to  fashion  and  also  to  stimulate  a  new  interest  among  their  clients).  The 
entrepreneur has therefore an important place, but his role does not predominate over the 
customer‟s one. 
Kirzner (1979, 1985) retains the ability of alertness for defining the entrepreneurial 
function. It is the ability to perceive opportunities for profit for new needs or to offer products 
best  suited  to  the  tastes  of  consumers
3. These opportunities are seized by entrepreneurs 
because: 
“If one has become sufficiently alerted to the existence of an opportunity –that is, one 
has become sufficiently convinced regarding the facts of a situation- it becomes virtually 
impossible to imagine not taking advantage of the opportunity so discovered” 
(Kirzner, [1985], p.22). 
The alertness acts thus positively on the coordination of plans of supply and demand in 
the market. 
                                                 
3 It can also be the implementation of new more  efficient production techniques.   6 
“In the course of this entrepreneurial process, new products may be introduced, new 
qualities of existing products may be developed, new methods of production may be ventured, 
new  forms  of  industrial  organization,  financing,  marketing  or  tackling  risk  may  be 
developed”. 
(Kirzner, [1985], p.30). 
As a result the entrepreneur generates knowledge shared by economics agents and 
therefore  reduces  their  ignorance.  Entrepreneurial  profit  is  a  pure  profit  that  is  not  to  be 
related to the use of any factor of production whatsoever. It follows a simultaneous decision 
to buy and sell in the wake of discoveries of price differences advantageous whose existence 
is based on the ignorance of agents about accurate supply and demand. According to Kirzner, 
discovering profit opportunities hitherto ignored by economic agents would therefore require 
no specific investment. 
This is an extreme position on the entrepreneurial function theorization which will be 
taken over by Casson (1982) in a more applied way. Individuals differ not only in their tastes, 
but also in access to information for various reasons related to their characteristics (social 
environment, education, occupation, etc…). The entrepreneur believes that the totality of the 
information available to him is unique; then he builds his decision alone and expects a profit 
by taking positions vis-à-vis others. It is only because he is the only one to start the project 
that he can expect a profit. His dilemma is to convince finance providers that he is right while 
revealing partial information because the others are also potential competitors and thus profits 
reducers‟.  
Recent researches (Fairlie, Robb, 2006) show that the capture of market opportunities 
is  not  independent  of  a  kind  of  « entrepreneurial  human  capital ».  This  latter,  linked  to 
relatives‟  environment  may  explain a larger propensity of entrepreneurship  in  families  of 
business owners. Yet successful entrepreneurship is nevertheless insured only if these new 
entrepreneurs have acquired a management experience in the enterprise of their parents. This 
management‟s experience allows them probably to move easily in a risky environment. 
This leads us to consider the initial endowments that an entrepreneur must have, the 
managerial and financial endowments he must have if he wants to launch a project with great 
chances of success. 
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3) Entrepreneurial abilities and resources access 
 
Decision-making in economics commits resources in order to achieve a single goal 
(maximizing the usefulness of the consumer, profit maximization of the company). In some 
cases the non-availability of certain resources even prevents the project from happening. The 
firm has theoretically no entrepreneur, as it makes choices among alternative values for a 
small number of well-defined variables: price, production, advertising expenses ... according 
to repetitive codified mathematical processes of maximization. Nevertheless Baumol (1968) 
noted that there is room for clever ruses, ingenious schemes, brilliant innovations, charisma 
that differentiate the entrepreneurs... 
There is therefore some skills to entrepreneurs. In this regard Lucas (1978) challenges 
the standard theory for which the U-shape of the curve production costs determines both the 
size, the number of companies and entry and exit of the firms on the market
4. It is more 
appropriate to postulate that there are individuals with various managerial capacities and that 
the distribution of managerial capacity i s explanatory of the various sizes of companies. A 
few individuals have then a high level of managerial leadership that allows them to launch 
and conduct large companies (recent examples: Bill Gates and Microsoft, Richard Branson 
and Virgin…). With the development, many small individual entrepreneurs will find most 
interesting to take a job in an existing business than to engage them in an entrepreneurial 
venture.  As  real  wages  have  increased,  a  number  of  low  endowed  managerial  abilities 
entrepreneurs will prefer to work as employees. The fact remains that this relationship is not 
linear,  as  we  find  that  the  development  of  the  economy  of  innovation  has  created  new 
opportunities for enhancing entrepreneurship (Audretsch, 2006). That's what demonstrates the 
high level of entrepreneurial activity observed on the North American continent. 
Some  authors  put  forward  access  to  financial  capital  as  a  prerequisite  for  any 
entrepreneurial commitment. A set of theoretical articles show that new entrepreneurs are 
financially constrained (Jaffee and Russell (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). The empirical 
results do not, however, lead to a clear conclusion. 
For instance, Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Evans and Leighton (1989), Holtz-Eakin, 
Joulfaian and Rosen (1994) show that start-ups suffer from capital gap: they show a positive 
relationship  between  individuals‟  wealth  and  their  probability  to  become  self-employed. 
Nevertheless  financial  capital  could  be  correlated  with  unobservable  factors  such  as 
managerial  skills,  or  more  generally  human  capital  of  the  entrepreneur.  Hence  the 
introduction in some work (Lindh and Ohlsson (1996), Blanchflower and Oswald (1998)) of 
exogenous events such as inheritances, gifts, income from the lottery confirms the positive 
influence of wealth on the entrepreneurial commitment. Financial constraints would exist and 
would tend to exclude those who have insufficient funds. 
According to Parker (2004) this leads to the endogeinity problem: 
“Whereby  the  self-employed  are  wealthy  because  of  previous  success  in  self-
employment”.  
                                                 
4 The motivations of his work is based on the fact that companies are often multi-products and that external 
growth strategies are complex and not only axed on the pursuit of the optimum size.   8 
S.C. Parker shed a light on several alternative explanations also consistent with the 
previous results on financial constraints.  
Berger and Udell (1992) adopt an intermediate position: they argue that while the 
macro effects of credit rationing may be small, there is evidence to suggest that when credit is 
rationed to some firms it may be more readily available to others. 
In  French  survey  Sine  (information  system  on  new  firms)  we  have  found  that  a 
majority of new firms is not facing credit rationing, but also that a non-negligible share is 
“self-constrained” (Bonnet, Cieply, Dejardin, 2005). Yet the study refers to entrepreneurial 
projects that are concretized in new firms. General entrepreneurial intentions in the French 
population that are aborted due to financial constraints are not reported. 
We confirm on the French case the result given by Cressy (1996) concerning British 
new firms:  
“We  conclude  that  firms  self-select  for  finance  (rather  than  being  selected  by  the 
banks), those with greater human capital being more likely to take up the bank’s offer. Thus, 
there is no credit rationing of startups” 
(Cressy, 1996, 1254).  
In  a  recent  research  (Hurst  and  Luzardi,  2004)  show  in  the  USA  that  there  is  no 
relationship between wealth and entrepreneurship for much of the distribution of wealth. The 
rate of entry is almost constant between the 1st and 9th decile and significantly increases for 
individuals  only  at  the  95th  percentile  or  below  the  5th  percentile  because  of  a  low 
opportunity cost. 
Of  course  these  results,  especially  the  French  results,  shed  a  light  on  the  lack  of 
entrepreneurship  spirit  and  opportunities  (see  below)  that  have  more  to  do  with  the 
functioning  of  a  “wage  society”  than  with  the  availability  of  financing.  Specifically  this 
accounts for the low development of venture capital in France
5.  
The choice to become an entrepreneur can also be analyzed as an arbitrage between a 
wage occupation and a risky firm‟s project. The project is risky because the future earnings 
that can be negative or positive are not known in advance. 
 
                                                 
5 However we can notice than in the third world the financial constraints are often binding. For instance it has 
been noticed that it is often too risky in these countries to change ones‟ way of life. One cannot transfer the 
minimum financial provision in order to engage in a production detour. This effect is counterbalanced thanks to 
microfinance and small business lending which allow people to get into entrepreneurship.   9 
4) Entrepreneurship: decision-making in uncertainty 
 
Indeed,  the  economy  is  continually  affected  by  shocks  that  play  a  role  on  the 
enterprise‟s performance. For example our individual that opens his restaurant engages his 
personal assets in the goal to obtain in the future a profit that is uncertain and depends on 
different probabilities on the states of the world (economic conjuncture, attractiveness of the 
restaurant, new law about the VAT, new rules about smoking/no smoking areas etc…). 
F. Knight (1921) is considered one of the first to justify the existence of the firm by 
uncertainty.  It  distinguishes  the  risk  that  is  measurable  from  the  uncertainty  that  is  not 
measurable by probabilities. The entrepreneur is then the one who endorses this uncertainty, 
makes decisions (hierarchical position) and control (he assumes the role of responsibility in 
particular in giving a fixed return to the factors of production). The entrepreneur earns profit 
as a counterpart of his management of uncertainty. Yet according to Knight the risk is not the 
source of profit because the firm can avoid it by an insurance mechanism. It represents only a 
cost. 
Nowadays the choice entrepreneur/wage earner is often analyzed in the frame of the 
standard  analysis  of  choice  in  uncertainty.  This  analysis  considers  the  preferences  of 
individuals represented by a function of expected utility, known as the Von-Neumann and 
Morgenstern function (1944), based on objectives probabilities. L. Savage (1954) also showed 
that under a number of assumptions, preferences can be represented by a function of expected 
utility  based  on  subjective  probabilities.  As  a  result,  the  distinction  between  risk  and 
uncertainty then presents little interest.  
Khilstrom and Laffont (1979) apply this analysis to the choice of individuals between 
working  as  an  employee  in  a  competitive  job  market  or  becoming  an  entrepreneur.  The 
second choice is viewed as more risky. While an employee may lose his job, his salary is at 
least partly independent of the results of the firm in which he is working.  
The gain of entrepreneurship can be measured by the certain equivalent income that 
the individuals assigned to this activity. This is the monetary valuation of possible future 
gains. It depends on their risk‟s attitude and decreases when individuals show risk aversion. It 
is  sufficient  then  to  compare  this  equivalent  to  the  salary  that  some  people  perceive  to 
understand their decision assuming that wage is perceived without uncertainty. The authors 
show that, at the equilibrium, the individuals demonstrating the greatest risk aversion become 
employed while those  who are less averse  become entrepreneurs.  In  addition,  among the 
entrepreneurs, those who have the least amount of risk aversion lead larger companies
6.  
Stewart and Roth (2001) in a meta -analysis show that entrepreneurs have a greater 
level of risk-propensity. Yet this result is challenge by Miner and Raju (2004) that claim that 
the result is not so clear because some  relevant studies have not been taken into account. 
Moreover these last authors think that it is necessary to control for some variables as 
                                                 
6 Some also define the risk premium of entrepreneurship (entrepreneurship premium). This is the difference 
between the evaluation of future profits (certain equivalent) by a given individual and an individual neutral with 
respect to the risk.   10 
Brockhaus  (1987)  in  a  previous  study  has  already  recognized  like  gender,  cultural 
background, stage of business development and type of business owned.  
Liles (1974) has identified four main negative occurrences of risk-taking in case of 
failure. The financial difficulties that could lead to a significant reduction in living standards, 
the  psychological  well-being  of  the  person  who  committed  himself  to  the  creation,  the 
professional career which can be compromised and the familial risk that could also exist if the 
firm survives because being an entrepreneur requires investing a lot of time.  
It was also observed that in most cases a greater propensity for risk (for entrepreneurs) 
is  tempered  by  a  deep  judgment  that  prevents  them  from  taking  extreme  risks  (Mueller, 
Thomas, 2001). 
The representation of the behavior of individuals with an expected utility function is 
nevertheless  contested,  partly  as  a  result  of  the  complexity  of  the  environment  in  which 
decisions  must  be  taken  or  because  experience  shows  that  individuals  do  not  always  act 
rationally but by relying on their intuition.   11 
5) The limit of rationality in the decision-making  
 
The complexity refers to situations in which the decision-maker is not sure what the 
probability distribution of a future event will be because of too complex interactions. In fact 
the  decision  is  often  taken  with  the  help  of  simplified  mechanisms  (with  deformation  of 
probabilities by the agents). Herbert Simon (1955, 1956) highlighted the bounded rationality 
of decision makers who are limited in both knowledge and the capacity to calculate. The 
implementation  of  means  to  achieve  the  ends  and  its  consequences  are  poorly  known. 
Compared to the optimal decision, alternatives choices are found. The opportunities for profit 
are partly built by entrepreneurs based on their perceptions (mental constructs in a repetitive 
non  optimizing  cognitive  process).  Entrepreneurs  have  a  strong  tendency  to  consider  the 
opportunity as unique and that the situation decision could not be replicated. 
They resort to heuristics simplifying assumptions (Kahneman, 2003) and are subject to 
bias decision because: 
“People rely on a limited number of heuristics principles which reduce the complex 
tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations” 
(Tversky and Kahneman, [1974], p.1124). 
For instance two individuals will attribute a different success‟s probability to a typical 
restaurant (restaurant with Cuban food and Cuban musical entertainment) according to their 
perception of the reality. One of them will attribute a higher probability than another one 
because such an establishment is opened and works close to his home. His estimation does not 
rely on a rational calculus but more on a subjective perception. 
Kahneman and Tversky have also shown that economic agents do not have a constant 
behavior with regard to risk. More precisely, a same individual manifests less risk-aversion 
when he has to choose between losses than when he has to choose between gains (reflection 
effect). This  lower risk-aversion in  the field  of losses  may then conduct  some long term 
unemployed people to entrepreneurship (self-employment). In effect unemployment that lasts 
may be analyzed as a situation of a certain loss of wealth and then decreases the degree of 
risk-aversion of individuals. 
Moreover in the standard analysis, the entrepreneur is considered as a passive game 
player that considers the success or failure‟s probabilities as exogenous. Yet the entrepreneur 
plays a more important role. The essential difference is that the game player cannot exercise 
any control on the gain while the entrepreneur may influence by his acts the becoming of his 
decision. According to Byers, Kist, and Sutton (1998) the entrepreneurs often estimate that 
their decisions are based on facts and that their returns rely more on their perspicacity and 
their judgment than on their luck. They have a tendency to overestimate the influence of their 
competences. Then another bias that is documented in some studies is the entrepreneurial 
overconfidence  (the  fact  that  in  participating  himself  to  the  action  the  entrepreneur 
overestimate his chance of success).  
According to Cooper, Dunkelberg and Woo (1988), 68% of the entrepreneurs estimate 
their own probabilities of success to be more important than for similar enterprises directed by 
others. 33% of them think even that their probability of success is of 100%. For De Meza and   12 
Southey  (1996),  the  population  of  new  entrepreneurs  has  a  tendency  to  overestimate  the 
occurrence of future favorable events. Then the entrepreneurial overconfidence intervenes in 
the level of indebtedness if the wealth of the entrepreneur is insufficient to cover the initial 
investment project. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) have built an experiment where subjects have 
choice to entry on the market. In the case of subjects that self select themselves (the returns of 
their risky decisions depend on their competencies) they have observed more entrants on the 
market. Self-selection reinforces overconfidence because participants think they can beat the 
bets. This optimism behavior tends to persist even in case of bad results (Ross and Anderson, 
1982),  because  individuals  show  some  difficulties  in  accepting  they  have  made  errors. 
Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) show that this behavior leads to a preference for ignorance. At 
best the revision process of the probabilities is incomplete according to Bénabou and Tirole 
(2002). 
This capability to shoulder the true uncertainty needs a high degree of self-confidence, 
the belief in his effective power of control, in his good fortune that rely on some personality 
traits. 
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6)  The  inclusion  of  non-economic  factors:  the  example  of  the 
entrepreneur personality 
 
The classic utility function does not include a number of psychological characteristics 
or personal enjoyment that drives the economic agent in his decision-making. The importance 
of psychological variables has been for a long time sustained by numerous research works 
(McClelland, 1961, Shapero, 1975, Koh, 1996). 
Among psychological variables the locus of control (Mueller and Thomas, 2000) and 
the need of achievement (Johnson 1990) are key variables. 
The locus of control (Rotter 1971) reflects the disposition to act for an individual, that 
is to say the degree with which he thinks that he can have an influence on his environment. 
Some individuals are then said external because they are inclined to think that the awards they 
received in their life are outside their own control and they rely on luck, on the benevolence 
of a mentor, or the control of a powerful person. Others think that they can modify for good or 
bad the course of these events. This latter psychological characteristic, qualified as internal 
locus of control, has been found in the entrepreneurial involvement and in the opportunity to 
exploit some effective abilities of leadership (Shapero 1975). It expresses one thing we often 
find in the surveys on the motives to set up or to take over a new firm as the notion of 
« willingness  to  control  his  destiny ».  Praag,  Sluis  and  Witteloostuijn,  2004  have  then 
demonstrated that a positive link exists between this characteristic and the earnings of two 
populations  (employees  and entrepreneurs) of the National  Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY).  They  find  that  the  coefficient  is  stronger  for  entrepreneurs  (in  comparison  with 
salaried people). 
Mac Clelland (1961) has resumed the concept of Achievement Motivation defined in 
Murray (1938) in his personality system. Along this latter a need is “strength in the spirit 
region which organizes the perception, the intellectual activity and the action”; the specific 
need of achievement is then defined as the accomplishment of something difficult in fields as 
large as to manage, operate or organize the physical objects but also human behaviors and 
ideas. An individual responding to a need of achievement motive is going to try to achieve his 
goal as quickly and independently as possible. He is going to try to excel in the clearing of 
obstacles and especially he is going to try to go into competition with other individuals to try 
to  outdo  them and this  with  the  goal  to  increase his  satisfaction in  the setting up of his 
successful talent, the entrepreneur field is then a field of excellence of the exercise of the need 
of achievement. Collins, Hanges and Locke (2004) in the frame of a meta-analysis  show the 
link between the Need of Achievement and the choice to follow an entrepreneurial orientation 
but also the level of performance of the entrepreneur.  
Lee and Tsang (2001) have then demonstrated that a positive link exists between the 
need of achievement and the venture growth. Like the need of achievement, the internal locus 
of control shows the same result for larger firms of their sample. 
These traits of personal characteristics and also moral attitudes have been historically 
recognized by the greatest economists as being favourable to entrepreneurial decision-making   14 
and success of the new company. Van Praag (2006) provides an admirable summary of the 
findings from which we are indebted in the following paragraph. 
To  Say  (1803)  a  successful  entrepreneur  must  demonstrate  prudence,  probity  and 
regularity. Marshall (1890) defines general ability for a successful entrepreneur as: 
"To be able to bear in mind many things at a time, to have everything ready when wanted, to 
act promptly and show resource when anything goes wrong, to accommodate oneself quickly 
to changes, to be steady and trustworthy, to have always a reserve of force... " (Marshall 
[1890] 1930, p. 206-207). 
According to Schumpeter, the entrepreneur should not feel reluctant to do something 
new (Van Praag, 2006). 
“This mental freedom ...is something peculiar and by nature rare” (Schumpeter [1911] 1939, 
p. 86). The entrepreneur should “be strong enough to swim against the tide of the society in 
which he is living” (Heertje, 1982, p. 86). He must have leadership skills, a special interest in 
creativity “the joy of creation”, “a taste for the competition”, the will to win “and wants to 
achieve a certain social distinction”. 
For  Knight  (1921)  the  ability  to  deal  with  uncertainty  requires  a  high  degree  of  self-
confidence, a disposition to act on one‟s own opinion and belief in his good fortune. Kirzner 
(1973)  puts  forward  the  concept  of  alertness  which  is  the  only  character  trait  that  the 
entrepreneur needs. 
“The  kind  of  knowledge  required  for  entrepreneurship  is  knowing  where  to  look  for 
knowledge. ... The word, which captures most closely this kind of “knowledge”, seems to be 
alertness”. 
Baumol (1968) thinks it is not possible to integrate all these qualities in a formalized 
theory. It may, however be possible to examine what can be done to encourage this activity 
which is essential for economic development, (Leibenstein, 1968). And to do that requires 
putting  more  interest  in  the  pay  off  of  the  activity  of  entrepreneurs  ...  ie  looking  for 
occupational choices. 
 
7)  Entrepreneurial  decision-making:  also  a  decision  to  create  his 
own job 
 
The decision to become an entrepreneur is to a large extent a microeconomic decision 
about  the  proper  allocation  of  one‟s  human  capital,  balancing  an  opportunity  cost  of 
entrepreneurship with a reward expectation (monetary, symbolic, social reward, psychological 
reward). According to Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), the returns of the financial 
initial investment of the entrepreneur are not higher than the one he would obtain on the 
financial markets while the risk (due to the non-diversification) is important:  
“About 75 percent of all private equity is owned by households for whom it constitutes 
at least half of their total net worth. Furthermore, households with entrepreneurial equity 
invest on average more than 70 percent of their private holdings in a single private company 
in which they have an active management interest”  
(Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002, p.745)   15 
The decision to  start  a  business  is  most of the time associated with  a decision to 
become self-employed. Two main individual motives drive the decision to set up a firm: 
- A constrained motive (or push motive): new entrepreneurs are motivated by a low 
opportunity cost of entrepreneurship. This may be due to an individual situation of failure in 
the  labor  market  (unemployment  or  employed  with  a  bad  match)  or  to  perceived 
dissatisfactions in a salaried position (insufficient independence, not satisfying his need of 
achievement, partial control of his own fate)
7.  
- An opportunity motive (or pull motive): new entrepreneurs are positively drawn to 
entrepreneurship. It corresponds to a strategy for an individual to obtain better rewards on his 
human  capital,  which  may  be  undervalued  by  the  labor  market  due  to  information 
asymmetries  or  work  incentive  considerations
8.  It  can  also  result  from  the  individual 
capability to perceive and to seize market opportunities, to transform an idea in an innovative 
project. 
Both reasons are not independent. An economy that creates a lack of jobs (low growth 
rate) and that suffers from the ma lfunctioning of the labor market  -  for example a high 
average duration of unemployment - strengthens entrepreneurship for reasons rather negative 
and especially discourage entrepreneurial venture for positive reasons. In France the share of 
unemployed new entrepreneurs is high because the propensity to set up a firm when employed 
or being a student is low. 
At the European level, Wennekers (2006) shows that there is a negative relationship 
between the unemployment rate and the propensity to set-up a firm. This result confirms the 
fact that labor market considerations have an influence on the total entrepreneurial activity. 
Many  macroeconomic  and  institutional  causes  can  explain  the  differences  in 
entrepreneurial intensity between countries and areas. They include the economic growth, the 
rate of  unemployment,  the development  and  the  operation  of  the financial  system,  the 
intensity of the administrative barriers, specificities of the labor market, legal consequences of 
the failure of the firm, the entrepreneurship‟s spirit and the collective perception of the failure 
of the firm … This set of causes refer to what William J. Baumol names in a notable 1990 
article
9 the rules of the game - i.e. the structure of reward in the economy-. He notes that 
certain  societies  historically  favored  rather  unfavorable  structures  of  reward  to  the 
development of entrepreneurship. These structures divert the national or local elites from the 
exercise  of  the  entrepreneurial  function  and  prove  indirectly  harmful  to  the  diffusion  of 
technical progress (ancient Rome with the valorization of the political office, medieval China 
with  the  mandarin  system…).  Over  the  recent  period,  they  enable  us  to  understand  the 
“unhooking”  of  certain  European  countries  in  reference  to  the  difference  which  exists 
between an entrepreneurial society which develop the private initiative and a wage society 
                                                 
7 Professional dissatisfaction of the entrepreneur in respect of the jobs held prior to the establishment of his 
company are wider than simple wage claims. They cover such considerations as more autonomy (Cromie, 1987) 
problems with co-workers or the hierarchy (Brockhaus, 1980, Greenbank, 2006), career prospects (Dyer 1994). 
8 This imperfect valuation of human capital in the labor market can result from an insufficient functioning of the 
internal labour market in the enterprise for different reasons (small size of firms, imperfect observability of the 
individual productivity, or firm‟s strategy to restrict the scope of wages in the goal of preserving the social 
cohesion). 
9 Baumol William J., 1990, « Entrepreneurship, Productive, Unproductive and Destructive», Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 98, October, pp. 893-921.   16 
which increases the opportunity cost to undertake. In an entrepreneurial society, being a wage 
earner does not give the insurance of a stable situation because of the greatest latitude for the 
employers to lay off. On the other hand the flexibility of the labor market can more easily 
encourage the individuals to undertake insofar as this action constitutes a positive signal for 




The entrepreneurial commitment can be considered as decision-making by excellence 
in economics. Indeed, it implies uncertainty and risk-taking because the entrepreneur is fully 
responsible for the development of the new company, and in general he has committed a 
significant part of his personal savings to the firm. Also from a microeconomic point of view, 
entrepreneurial  involvement  is  complex.  It  refers  to  the  desire  of  a  better  recognition 
(valuation of his human capital) but also to some personal aspirations to address professional 
dissatisfaction or in search of better met some characteristics of the work of entrepreneur. 
From  a  macroeconomic  point  of  view,  labor  market  rigidities  combined  with 
institutional inefficiencies may lead in some European countries to a strong entrepreneurship 
for  depreciation  or  opportunity  costs  motives  (push  motives)  but  globally  to  a  weak 
propensity  of  setting-up  a  firm  for  innovative  motives  –valuation  of  a  new  idea-  (pull 
motives).  Too  strong  a  rigidity  of  the  labor  market  and  the  stigmatization  of  the 
entrepreneurial failure discourage a certain number of qualified and experienced employees to 
value  their  human  capital  in  the  entrepreneurial  option.  In  most  European  countries,  the 
unemployed population is very much overrepresented in the population of new entrepreneurs.  
Some cultural aspects may also be put forward. For example Hostede (2001) notices 
that uncertainty-avoidance is not equally distributed among the cultures. It is in countries 
where the uncertainty-avoidance is higher that we find the lower levels of self-employment. 
In  these  countries  individuals  like  to  follow  rules  and  procedures,  have  a  taste  for  the 
administrated organization. A recent study from Noorderhaven, Thurik, Wennekers and Stel 
(2004) show that the level of self-employment in 15 European countries is partly explained by 
dissatisfactions with life and the way democracy works. These two dissatisfactions according 
to the authors are close to professional dissatisfaction. 
The insufficient pull motives for entrepreneurship in Europe refer to what Audretsch 
calls  the  European  paradox  (Audretsch,  2007).  The  lack  of  entrepreneurship  capital  in 
Europe leads to a high level of knowledge investments for a poor result in terms of growth 
and reduction of unemployment.  
“Barriers to entrepreneurship can impede knowledge spillover entrepreneurship. Such 
barriers range from legal restrictions and impediments to the existence and availability of 
early stage finance, or to social and institutional tradition discouraging entrepreneurship and 
a stigma associated with failed attempts as entrepreneurship. The capacity of an economy to 
generate entrepreneurial behaviour is shaped by the extent of its underlying entrepreneurship 
capital”, 
(Audretsch, 2007, p.69) 
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